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Political actors derive influence both from their official position and from 
their own personal standing. However, political science has proven to be 
better equipped to study formal powers and institutions. The study of 
informal arrangements, where actors rely on personal connections and 
authority, is more challenging. This has arguably led to the 
predominance of an institutional focus in research. We argue for the 
study of informal sources of power as an equally important area of 
research. Drawing from historical and contemporary examples, we re-
introduce the concepts of auctoritas and potestas to underline the 
difference between individual and institutional sources of influence. We 
discuss the various obstacles to measurement and outline attempts 
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If political science is the examination of the processes and structures that 
govern the redistribution of resources across a given political regime, clearly, 
such processes and structures include both formal and informal aspects. 
Because formal power relationships are observable and measurable in a way 
that informal power relationships are not, most of the existing research 
gravitates to the study of the former. For example, scholars study the relative 
influence and power of parliament versus cabinet, or of various cabinet posts 
within that cabinet, the duration in office of ministers, or the processes by 
which parliamentarians are elected, among many other similar inquiries. 
Scholars also study the differences in the institutional powers of prime 
ministers, presidents, or organizations, whether within or between countries. 
These studies tend to overlook the importance of informal power structures, 
personal relations and processes not measured by a purely institutional 
approach. 
Consider an illustrating example from contemporary Polish politics. 
From 2015 Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the head of the Law and Justice party (PiS), has 
been arguably as influential as, if not more than, the country’s nominal 
political leaders — Prime Minister Beata Szydlo and President Andrzej Duda. 
This is because Kaczynski chose to neither run for the presidency nor to 
nominate himself as prime minister after his party won the 2015 legislative 
election. Instead, he decided to have his loyalists, Andrzej Duda and Beata 
Szydlo, be nominated for these posts. As a result, these two protégés assumed 
leadership posts nominally superior to that of their patron, a mere member of 
parliament. But the de facto power in Polish politics clearly remained with 
Kaczynski. Most expert observers and the public at large understand that 
from late 2015 Jaroslaw Kaczynski had been the de facto political leader in 
Poland. Kaczynski had usually been addressed “as ‘prezesie’, the Polish word 
for ‘chief’, instead of the customary ‘premierze’ — prime minister — the most 
senior title he has held”, with no important policies and decisions being made 
without his input (Financial Times, 2016). Because such power arrangement 
was apparently based largely on informal relationships, its subsequent study 
may be a task worthy of Sovietologists, in a sense that conclusions would 
have to be derived based on who was not clapping whom and why (e.g., 
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Krzymowski, 2015).  This mismatch in power between formal, nominal 
leadership positions and the real, de facto power-holders, has not only been 
challenging for scholars who study institutions but also for practitioners of 
politics. Jan Cienski wrote that the Polish power arrangement was 
particularly irksome in foreign affairs, especially for EU partners who met 
Polish political leaders in full knowledge that the latter did not make final 
decisions and that Kaczynski’s approval was required (Cienski, 2016).  
The mismatch between nominal leadership positions and the identities 
of de facto leaders underlines that there is more to political power than what is 
determined by the formal, institutionalized position. This is particularly 
striking at the level of national leadership. Kaczynski of Poland from 2015, 
Vladimir Putin of Russia from 2008--12, or Deng Xiaoping of China from 
1978--89 are all examples of effective, de facto national leaders, who all 
occupied positions different from those occupied by the nominal leaders. 
Numerous examples also exist of individuals without any formal post who 
nevertheless are able to exert significant influence. In France during the 
Fourth Republic from 1946-58, Charles de Gaulle, who was out of power at 
the time, retained strong influence on politics through his control of the 
Rassemblement	du	Peuple	Français	(RPF)	party,	 the	network	of	supporters	 from	
the	war	period,	and	his	personal	standing	as	 the	 “most	 illustrious	Frenchman”.	
Clearly,	none	from	almost	two	dozens	of	prime	ministers	at	the	time	was	able	to	
match	de Gaulle in terms of his overall personal influence. Arguably, it is such 
personal sources of power that permitted de Gaulle to seize control of the 
government in 1958 (Hazareesingh, 2012) and thus turn his informal into 
formal power.	The apparent dominance of some political actors over others 
with stronger formal powers is a phenomenon that can be found in both 
democracies and dictatorships. It can also be found at the levels of national 
political leadership and lower ranks in politics and civil service. These types 
of situations are challenging for scholars of politics, as researchers need to 
assess informal connections and sources of authority which are not explicitly 
defined by formal institutional structures. 
There are competing, often epistemologically opposed perspectives on 
how to conceptualize and measure informal, personal, and non-institutional 
sources of power. In this prescriptive paper, we propose the ancient concepts 
of auctoritas and potestas, employed in antiquity to distinguish between the 
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personal standing and the powers of office (Mommsen, 1894). Focusing our 
discussion on the personal influence of an individual in a political system, we 
illustrate how these concepts may help us to understand the formal and 
informal sources of power in contemporary politics. We probe the 
relationship between auctoritas and potestas and discuss factors behind them. 
Next, we outline the various obstacles to measurement and outline 
approaches proposed in the literature. We conclude by arguing for political 
science to be more cognizant of informal sources of power of political actors.	
 
 Auctoritas and Potestas in politics 
 
Political actors derive influence from their official position in the 
institutionalized structure, their office, but also from their own personal 
standing and individual attributes. Such actors implement various actions 
and policies that may affect their environment but in the analysis of impact on 
their environment it is always very difficult to distinguish “the person from 
the position which that person occupies” (Blondel 1987, 5). Leaving aside the 
question of the attribution of causal effects for the moment, we turn to what it 
means to differentiate the office from the person who occupies that office.  
Consider the Russian presidency, the most powerful office in the 
country. According to law, the president possesses significant formal powers 
over hiring and firing of various officials, is in control of foreign, defense and 
security policy and has the authority to dissolve the legislature and dismiss 
the cabinet, among other things. Vladimir Putin, who occupied that office 
from 2000-2008, and then again, from 2012, was therefore the officeholder of 
the most powerful post in the country during these times. Because Article 
81(3) of the Russian constitution bans presidential candidates from being re-
elected for a third term consecutively, and perhaps following his own 
personal preferences at the time, Putin chose to step down from the 
presidency in 2008 and instead, from 2008-12, he served as prime minister, an 
office subordinate to that of the president. Despite this, during this time he 
undoubtedly remained the de facto political leader of the country (Baturo and 
Mikhaylov, 2014).  
As prime minister, Putin had significant policy authority over social-
economic development, and he also headed the ruling party, United Russia 
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(Edinaya Rossiya), with a constitutional majority in parliament. His own pre-
eminence however stemmed not from the formal powers of prime ministerial 
office but rather from a multitude of informal sources of power, some only 
indirectly related to this post. First of all, a much better economy than in the 
1990s, in combination with the regime’s tight control of mass media, 
generated consistently high personal approval ratings for Vladimir Putin 
(Treisman, 2011). Many officials apparently came to believe that the 
president’s influence transcended the powers of his office, i.e., that	 the	
country’s	success	emanated	not	from	the	formal	institutions	of	government	but	
from	 the	 personal	 leadership	 of	 Putin.	 By	 this	 logic, Putin’s own personal 
standing rather than the fact that he was the president, became paramount. In 
2007, while Vladimir Putin was still in the presidential office but declared that 
he would not run for the third term in 2008, the speaker of the Russian 
parliament at the time, Boris Gryzlov, proposed to think of Putin not in terms 
of the office he occupied or would occupy, but as the “national leader”: 
“Vladimir Putin will remain the national leader irrespective of the post he 
will occupy. … such leader is, has to be, and will be Vladimir Putin. … We 
will draw on every possibility to ensure that the country is continued to be 
led by Vladimir Putin” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta , 2007). Secondly, Putin’s political 
power also emanated from the fact that many influential officeholders in the 
cabinet, presidential administration, enforcement agencies and other 
institutions, including his successor President Medvedev, were appointed by 
and owed their elevation to Vladimir Putin personally (Baturo and Elkink, 
2016). In other words, during the 2008-12 period, Putin’s informal and 
personal sources of power were so dominant, that, in combination with his 
formal powers of prime minister, they apparently trumped the formally 
superior institutional powers of President Medvedev. Simply put, there was 
little doubt that Prime Minister Putin was more powerful than President 
Medvedev from 2008-12. Some observers even argued that, similarly to the 
Principate of Augustus --- which we discuss in the section below, Putin 
established the `Principate of Putin' (Nezavisimaya	Gazeta,	2011). 
The examples of Kaczynski in democratic Poland from 2015 and 
Vladimir Putin in authoritarian Russia from 2008-12 underline the point that 
formal powers of office are not always sufficient to explain the real 
distribution of power. Therefore, real-life political settings exist that may 
	 6	
necessitate observers to distinguish between informal and formal sources of 
personal power in order to make valid inferences and to avoid drawing 
incorrect conclusions based on the analysis of formal institutions alone. If this 
is the case, that informal aspects of power and influence are frequently 
important in politics, the question arises how we can conceptualize the 
difference between institutional and informal sources of power. 
Rather than re-inventing the wheel, we propose to re-examine the 
ancient terms for formal and informal powers that we believe help to 
understand the relationship between these powers better. Specifically, we 
propose the terms of auctoritas and potestas. Below we discuss the origins and 
usage of these terms as practiced in history, before turning to the discussion 
of how they can assist in improving our understanding of contemporary 
politics better.  
The ancients recognized that political influence can stem from both the 
power and prestige of the political office one occupied --- potestas or imperium, 
and also from the power and prestige of the particular individual holding it --
- auctoritas. Auctoritas was understood as the individual clout and standing, 
ability to shape the agenda and ability to influence policies.1 The term of 
auctoritas appears to originate with the authority of the Senate in contrast to 
the authority of the magistrates (Mommsen 1894, 330). Thus, auctoritas can 
both mean the individual authority (as opposed to the powers of office), and 
the senate's latent authority, the will of the senate's majority (Balsdon 1960, 
43). Henceforth, we refer to auctoritas in its more general meaning, to denote 
individual authority.  
In contrast, influence gained by the powers of office, the right to 
command, was referred to as potestas or imperium, granted to Roman 
officeholders. While imperium implied military command and was conferred 
on the top elected officials such as consuls, potestas implied legal powers and 
was applied to all civil officials. Thus, consuls had personal influence, 
auctoritas, before being elected, but they were granted potestas only after 
assuming office (Mommsen 1894, 1033-1044). Oftentimes, individuals with 
																																																								
1 The modern English word of authority, while it is derived from auctoritas, 
unlike its Roman predecessor also encompasses the right to command, thus 
making it less distinguishable from potestas or imperium. 
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similar formal powers had significant disparity in overall influence because of 
differences in informal power and personal standing. Even though emperor 
Marcus Aurelius named his associate Lucius co-emperor with equal powers 
of imperium, they were not equal de facto. Since Marcus Aurelius had already 
shared imperial powers before, was older and more experienced, it was clear 
that he had more auctoritas --- an “intangible, but measurable factor in Roman 
public life” … ``He had been consul once more than Lucius, he had shared in 
Pius' administration, and he alone was Pontifex Maximus. It would have been 
clear to the public which emperor was the more senior” (Birley 2000, 117). 
Consider the first Roman ruler of the Principate period, Octavian 
Augustus (27 BC-14 AD). During his long reign Augustus preserved the 
republican facade and occupied a plethora of formal, political offices (e.g., 
consul, proconsul) and even religious posts, as well as more informal roles 
(e.g., Father of the Nation) intermittently (Suetonius 1914, [c. 121 AD] Vol. I, 
Book II, LIII). Thus, Augustus retained annual consulship for five years into 
his tenure, relinquished it, only to occupy it again twice more later in his 
reign. He also held the powers, but not the official titles, of tribune and censor 
(Suetonius 1914, [c. 121 AD] Vol. I, Book II, XXVI). Even though Augustus did 
not institutionalize his authority as, for instance, perpetual dictator, his tacit 
pre-eminence was encapsulated by the new titles of princeps --- often reserved 
for the highest ranking senator, which now came to stand for, simply, the first 
citizen --- and, later in his reign, of Father of the Nation (ibid, LVIII). 
Augustus derived his superior status not from any particular office but from 
being himself, Augustus --- ``Number One''. In fact, Octavian himself argued 
that he did not possess any more potestas than any other officeholders, he only 
had more auctorias (personal influence) (Wirszubski 1950, 109-118). In his 
words: 
 
For this service of mine I received the name of Augustus by decree of 
the senate, and the doorposts of my house were publicly decked with 
laurels, the civic crown was affixed over my doorway, and a golden 
shield was set up in the Julian senate house, which, as the inscription 
on this shield testifies, the Roman senate and people gave me in 
recognition of my valour, clemency, justice, and devotion. After that 
time I excelled all in authority, but I possessed no more power than the 
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others who were my colleagues in each magistracy (Augustus, Res 
Gestae 34 in Brunt and Moore 1969, 39). 
 
The overall influence of Augustus --- the “foundation on which that influence 
rested,” was “his command over several provinces and the legions stationed 
there, his incomparable financial resources, and a vast network of clients”  
(Eck 2003, 54). Furthermore, “the term auctoritas by itself sounds harmless 
enough, but one must not lose sight of what really counted, namely the 
sources of concrete power behind it” (Eck 2003, 54).  
In later periods in history, in both contemporaneous writings and in 
later commentaries and analyses, a continuation of the distinction between 
the person and the office that person occupies can be found. The doctrine of 
the Catholic Church enforced strict distinction “between the charisma of 
office and the worthiness of the person” (Weber 1978, 1141) and 
“differentiated, as does every bureaucracy, between the office (ex cathedra) 
and the incumbent” (Weber 1978, 1140).  This separation of a person 
occupying an office and function, office itself, thus allowed the church to 
disassociate itself from individual priests whose behavior could have stained 
its reputation. In the influential study of royal power in France and other 
Western European monarchies in the middle ages, Ernst Kantorowicz (2016 
[1957]) discussed how medieval theologians and lawyers distinguished 
between two bodies of the king: the body natural, the mortal body of the 
royal person, and the body politic, the immortal, political body, i.e., the office 
of the king. The dual nature of the king, his personal attributes and the 
physical body on the one hand, as well as his sovereign body on the other, 
also explains the famous dictum, “Le	roi	est	mort,	vive	le	roi	---	the	king	is	dead,	
long	 live	 the	king”,	proclaimed	during	royal	 succession	(ibid.,	409-19).	How to 
separate the actions of the king as a person from those of his office was often 
complex.  “The difficulties of defining the effects as exercised by the body 
politic --- active in the individual king … --- on the royal body natural are 
obvious (ibid., p. 12); “it was difficult to establish a clear distinction ‘between 
the will of the Crown and what the king wants’ ” (ibid., p. 18). Similar	 to	
political	scientists	of	 today	who	generally	prioritise	 institutions	over	 individual	
political	 actors,	 medieval	 jurists	 also	 assumed	 that	 body	 politic	 was	 more	
important	than	body	natural	(ibid., p. 18). 
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In summary, there exists a long tradition that conceptualises office and 
officeholder and distinguishes between the personal and institutional aspects 
of political influence.  Similarly, in contemporary leadership literature there is 
a recognition that the so-called assigned leaders whose authority is based on 
``occupying a position in an organization'' are not always able to become 
effective, real leaders, in contrast to individuals that are regarded as the most 
influential members of such organizations, ``regardless of the individual's 
title'' (Northouse 2009, 5-6). In contrast, Rose (1991, 10) underscores the 
influence of office in his study of prime ministers, which ``exists 
independently of its transitory incumbents; it is there before a particular 
individual becomes prime minister and it will remain after the individual 
leaves.'' Curiously, academic political science has largely ignored the 
distinction, leaving the discussion of formal and informal powers of various 
political actors largely to the speculation of informed observers and the 
public.  
 
(Re-)Introducing Auctoritas and Potestas  
 
While we can certainly refer to institutional sources of influence as either 
formal powers, the influence of office, ex cathedra, even body politic, and to 
personal sources of influence as personal effects, or informal or individual 
influence, for the remainder of this article we use the terms of potestas and 
auctoritas. The reasons are twofold. First, we rely on the terms known in 
antiquity as a tribute to the first known usage of terms that are conceptually 
close to what we understand and discuss as formal and informal sources of 
personal power. Second, we turn to these terms to refer to the very specific 
aspects of power of individual political actors and in order to exclude other 
aspects that this article is not concerned with, such as the diffuse or discursive 
types of informal power that Lukes (2005) refers to as the third dimension of 
power (Swartz, 2005), or as informal institutions, unwritten socially accepted 
rules `outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, 
727). In other words, our focus is on personal sources of power, whether 
formal or informal, as opposed to institutions, whether formal or informal.  
Specifically, we understand auctoritas to refer to the amount of 
informal influence a particular individual may have within a particular 
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political organization, regime, or political setting. In contrast, the influence of 
office refers to the formal powers that individual derives from his or her 
office, such as the power over hiring and firing of officials, over specific policy 
domains, the power to distribute various resources vested by the office. In 
this sense, the influence of office is very similar to the powers of potestas or 
imperium as the ancients understood them, while auctoritas is specific to a 
particular individual, to his or her personal background, traits, skills and 
personal connections.  
The previously introduced examples of Kaczynski of Poland and Putin 
of Russia clearly illustrate the concepts of auctoritas and potestas between these 
politicians and their nominal superiors. Other examples from various 
countries, both historical and contemporary, abound. In Mexico from the late 
1920s to around 1935 the national political boss, the head of the ruling party, 
Jefe	 Máximo Calles had been more powerful than official presidents of the 
country at the time, Portes Gil (1928-30), Ortiz (1930-32) and Rodríguez	(1932-
34) (Weldon 2007, 248–50). Calles had the ministerial portfolios of war and 
later industry, nominally subordinate to the president, but his real power 
rested on his record during the Mexican revolution, his relationship with the 
former president Obregon, his own record as a former president, and his 
reliance on the network of loyalists in key political posts. In other words, 
Calles had a significant degree of auctoritas that permitted him to dominate 
others with more powerful potestas. When President Cardenas came to power 
in 1934 and replaced Calles’s supporters for his own lieutenants, Jefe	Máximo	
lost	his	influence	and	departed	from	the	scene.	The cases of prezesie Kaczynski 
from 2015 or “national leader” and Putin from 2008-12 are similar situations 
to that of Jefe	Máximo in Mexico in 1920-35. More extreme examples can be 
found at the national political leadership level. Indeed, some leaders possess 
so much auctoritas, that they maintain effective political leadership without 
holding a major political post at all. Rafael Trujillo (1930–61) of the Dominican 
Republic (who however remained the leader of the ruling Dominican party) 
and Anastasio Garcia Somoza of Nicaragua (1936–56) were both known to 
leave their presidential offices and rule their countries from behind the 
scenes. A similar phenomenon can be found in transitional democracies, such 
as in Georgia following the 2012 victory of the Georgian Dream coalition. Here 
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a billionaire and a politician, Bidzina Ivanishvili, quickly surrendered the 
office of prime minister to his former employees and business associates, 
Garibashvili in 2013 and then Kviriashvili in 2015, while continuing to 
maintain effective control (New York Times, 2013). 
 While the examples illustrate how individuals with stronger auctoritas 
may dominant politics at the national level, examples from lower ranks 
equally exist. Earlier we referred to the example of de Gaulle’s auctoritas in the 
mid-1950s. However, Jacques Foccart, President de Gaulle’s eminence grise, 
provides an even better illustration of an individual in French politics with an 
enormous influence not warranted by the posts he held. From 1960 he served 
as the president’s Chief Advisor on African Affairs --- the head of the so-
called African cell in the presidential administration. He also oversaw the 
external intelligence in addition to being the co-founder of Service d'Action 
Civique (Civic Action Service), de Gaulle’s personal paramilitary and secret 
service organization. During de Gaulle’s tenure as president (1958-69), Foccart 
not only exerted more influence on foreign policy than the ministers of 
cooperation or even of foreign affairs at the time, but arguably he was also the 
second most powerful in the French politics overall (Verschave, 1999). 
Clearly, it was his political skills, patronage network, proximity and 
relationship to the president rather than his formal position than made him so 
powerful. Even after de Gaulle’s departure in 1969, Foccart remained in 
politics under his successor, Pompidou, until 1974 (Péan, 1990). 
Also,	consider the office of the U.S. vice president that is granted very 
few powers by the constitution. Throughout its history this office has been 
overshadowed by other cabinet members and legislative leaders, it grew in 
importance under Walter Mondale in the late 1970s. However, it was Vice 
President Dick Cheney who, building on his lengthy political experience and 
close relationship with President Bush, came to exercise enormous influence. 
Likewise, Henry Kissinger had more influence as national security advisor 
than anyone in the same position (Mulcahi, 1986). The institutional powers of 
either role has not changed in recent times, yet the influence derived from 
these positions varies significantly between different office holders. 
Regardless of the legal or institutional arrangements for a particular office, 
some of the influence is clearly generated by the personality or personal 
background of the person in office. Indeed, the degree of influence over 
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domestic and foreign policy that Vice President Cheney wielded was due not 
only to the office that Cheney occupied but also to his own personal 
attributes, his lengthy political experience and close relationship with 
President Bush.	
Likewise, consider a more recent example from the Trump 
administration. While the office of the attorney general is a very powerful 
institution in American politics, there are grounds to think that Jeff Sessions, 
appointed early in 2017, may be able to exert significantly more influence on 
policy-making than many other attorneys general since Robert Kennedy 
(1961-64), an attorney general who was also a brother of the president. As 
reported by interlocutors in several media reconstructions of the inner 
workings of the Trump administration, the previously relatively unknown 
Sessions apparently has strong influence on key members of the 
administration, such as senior advisor Kushner and chief strategist Bannon, 
who are admirers of Sessions (The Washington Post, 2017). Furthermore, 
Sessions also has several former associates in influential positions in the 
administration. His former chief of staff Dearborn is appointed as deputy 
chief of staff for legislative affairs; senior advisor Hamilton at the Department 
of Homeland Security had previously been Sessions’ general counsel; and 
Miller, senior policy adviser, is another former staffer of Sessions (CNN	
Politics,	2017). In other words, at the time of this writing, Jeff Sessions appears 
to be very influential not because of his office alone but because of his own 
auctoritas.  
Even at the local level this distinction between the formal and informal 
powers of an individual can be found. Hunter’s famous study of power 
relations in a small community provides an illustrative example of auctoritas:  
 
“Charles Homer is the biggest man in our crowd. He gets an idea. 
When he gets an idea, others will get the idea. … Mr. Homer makes a 
brief talk; again, he does not need to talk long. He ends his talk by 
saying he believes in his proposition enough that he is willing to put … 
his own money into it for the first year. He sits down. … within thirty 
or forty minutes – we have pledges of the money we need. In three 
hours the whole thing is settled” (Hunter 1953, 173-4). 
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The exercise of authority without holding the top political post is not 
without consequences. For example in Russia, the fact that Vladimir Putin, 
despite his strong auctoritas during the “principat of Putin” still chose to 
return to the presidential office in 2012, indicates that holding the formal top 
office in the country with its potestas remains important, that relying on 
auctoritas alone may not be enough in the long run as the example of Jefe	
Máximo Calles illustrated. Furthermore, the focus on potestas and auctoritas of 
political leaders may enable us to understand more about the strength of 
institutions. In case of Kazcynski in Poland, the fact that a party leader can 
exert so much influence, or whether he would be able to continue to do so 
without assuming the post of prime minister later on, is not merely a curiosity 
of Polish politics or an inconvenience to its foreign partners. This mismatch 
also gives an indirect glance into the state of affairs in terms of political 
institutionalization, i.e., whether institutions are more important than political 
actors. In the final two sections of this paper we discuss the implications of 
auctoritas and potestas for regime dynamics, the problem of measurement of 
the concepts, as well as several caveats on how we can, or should, 
conceptualize these terms. 
It is important to clarify the scope of our argument. The concepts of 
auctoritas and potestas strictly refer to individual, personal influence within a 
polity, or on policy-making within a political regime. Other forms of informal 
power that we exclude from the argument have certainly received significant 
attention in the literature already, often with entire subfields of study. For 
example, Marxist theory pays significant attention to the dominance of the 
interests of one economic class over the other --- an important aspect but 
conceptually distinct from potestas and auctoritas discussed herein. Similarly, 
gender theory is concerned with the informal, discursive, and diffused power 
that the society bestows on one gender relative to the other. Through 
socialization and internalization, these power relations become deeply 
embedded in society and affect human interactions throughout the system. 
Such power relations are entirely unrelated to specific institutional 
arrangements or offices and are in that sense informal. Lukes (2005) defines 
these as the third dimension of power, and distinguishes from the first 
dimension of decision-making powers and the second dimension of agenda-
setting powers. This third dimension is “at a deeper, invisible level … 
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consist[ing] of deeply rooted forms of political socialization where actors 
unwittingly follow the dictates of power even against their best interests” 
(Swartz, 2005). Our argument here is more restrictive in that we argue for the 
incorporation of personal characteristics such as standing, experience, or 
persuasive powers when trying to understand one’s personal, individual 
influence --- as opposed to that of particular groups, institutions, classes, or 
other substrata of society --- on political decision-making.  
 
Accounting for Informal Personal Influence in Existing Research 
 
There is a long tradition in the political science literature that argues that a 
political actor's power can be rooted either in the institutional structure and 
norms (in the office), or in personal qualities, or identity, of the officeholder. 
While scholars who examine institutions often rightly criticize, for instance, 
earlier studies for bringing personalities and idiosyncratic anecdotes to the 
fore (Edwards 1983, 100), to deny that individuals can transform offices they 
occupy can be equally misleading. Indeed, certain leaders possess special 
characteristics that others do not --- “oratorial skill, a genuinely new idea, or 
perhaps `charisma'” (Ahlquist and Levi 2011, 6). Likewise, members of 
parliament that all occupy the same elected offices will differ in their degree 
of influence due to the differences in their background and experience, 
perceived career prospects, media exposure and powers of persuasion. 
In his classic study of power relations, Max Weber (1978) distinguished 
between legal-rational authority whereby obedience to a power-holder rests 
on rational norms and where one's power is legitimate as long as it is aligned 
with these norms, so that “obedience is thus given to the norms rather than to 
the person” on the one hand and “personal authority” on the other, where 
authority can rest on either tradition --- rooted in personal loyalty to the 
person in power, --- or on a more elusive political charisma, where individual 
authority is based “neither upon rational rules nor upon tradition” but rather 
on followers' recognition of the personal mission of their leader (Weber 1978, 
954, 1113).  Political leadership can thus derive its authority from institutional, 
legal-rational norms (of office), or from personal factors (officeholder). 
Likewise, in the influential treatise on the American presidency, Presidential 
Power, Neustadt defines power as the “personal influence of an effective sort 
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on governmental action”  (1990, ix) and distinguishes between three sources 
of power. First the formal powers vested by the constitution, second power 
coming from the professional reputation within Washington, and thirdly, 
“prestige, his public standing, amounting to impressions in the country 
generally about how well or badly he was doing as its President” (Neustadt 
1990, 185). In France, it is such personal, non-institutional aspects of influence 
that made Charles de Gaulle the most powerful president since the 
establishment of the Fifth Republic, even though the constitutional powers of 
the presidency has not changed since.  
Despite the importance of personal, non-institutional aspects of 
influence in politics, political science appears to be better equipped to 
examine formal powers and institutions. We examined the contents of 
abstracts of all articles in three premier journals in Political Science --- 
American Political Science Review (APSR), American Journal of Political Science 
(AJPS) and the Journal of Politics (JOP), as well as the premier journal in the 
comparative politics sub-field, Comparative Political Studies (CPS), for two 
years running from their first issue published in 2015, 581 articles altogether.2 
There are 103 articles published in APSR, 148 articles in AJPS, 196 in JOP, and 
134 in CPS. Altogether, we count 218 articles, or 38 per cent, that are focused 
on formal institutions as either their dependent variable to be explained (e.g., 
turnout at elections, international agreement, electoral reform) or as the main 
explanatory variable, i.e., emphasized as the explanatory variable in the 
abstract, not merely as one of the control variables in the body of the paper. 
Of the four journals examined, AJPS, CPS and JOP published a higher 
percentage of “institutional” articles, 43, 40 and 38 per cent respectively, while 
we classify only 25 per cent in APSR as such.  
What about informal and personal aspects of politics? As Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004, 726) pointed out, the subject of informal politics may covers 
an array of phenomena. We distinguish between several aspects. There are 25 
articles in total, or 4.3 per cent, that arguably focus on personal aspects and 
																																																								
2 We cover AJPS and JOP from January 2015 to January 2017 each, APSR from 




traits of political actors, such as personal traits and background of legislators, 
cabinet ministers and other politicians, as well as their career trajectories. For 
example, Carens and Lupu (2016) examined the effects of education of 
political actors at several levels of governance on performance in office and 
Alexiadou (2015) studied how background and careers of cabinet ministers 
influenced the direction of social welfare policy. In addition, there are 14 
articles, or 2.4 per cent, that are focused on national political leaders but 
almost none of them account for personal and background traits of such 
leaders. Instead, oftentimes such studies examine the effects of leaders’ death 
or leaving office on the outcomes of interests or the effects of institutions on 
leaders’ behavior and fate. In other words, the articles on leaders are also 
“institutional” and include formal institutions as explanatory or outcomes 
variables. For example, Treisman (2015) examines the relationship between 
economic growth, leader’s tenure, and the prospects for democracy, but 
leaders’ individual traits are not included in the explanation. The relative 
paucity of attention to non-institutional sources of power is exemplified by 
the fact that there are only 23 articles, or 4 per cent, on the subject of outside 
influences on politics, such as on lobbying, money in politics, influence of 
trade unions and corporations on elections and elected officials (e.g., 
Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2015).  
There is similar dearth of attention to the informal aspects of politics. 
There are only 22 articles, or 3.8 per cent, that focus on such informal aspects 
as those including informal governance, clans, factions and power brokers, 
patronage, and informal rules that underpin formal institutional 
arrangements. Skarbek (2016) is an example, studying the extent and form of 
informal inmate organization in prisons, while Xu and Yao (2016) examined 
informal institutions, rules, and norms in rural China. Pepinsky (2016) 
studied the effects of colonial networks of elite political and economic 
relations in Indonesia. Studies equally exist that highlight the importance of 
power relations within formal organizations, such as Kerevel (2015) who 
studied patronage relationships and the determinants of career trajectories of 
legislators in Mexico, or Dewan and Squintani (2016) who modeled party 
factions in the process of the development of an informed program of 
governance. Clearly, alongside informal aspects of politics, many of such 
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articles are also concerned with institutional aspects, such as how informal 
and formal institutions interact, or the sources of institutional change.  
 
The Problem of Measurement 
 
As we have outlined, although many authors in comparative politics have 
emphasized the importance of informal as well as formal powers, there 
continues to be a strong bias towards the latter in empirical research. We 
believe that this is primarily due not to the greater importance of formal 
structures, but to the challenges of measurement. Indeed, while such aspects 
of politics as, for example, tenure, formal powers, or parliamentary votes can 
be easily observed, in contrast, informal personal powers such as patronage 
relationships, personal standing, or dominance in interpersonal interactions 
cannot be directly observed, or at least not easily. In particular, in the more 
quantitative approaches to politics, this leads scholars to gravitate to and 
focus on institutions and formal posts, as evidenced in the previous section. 
Even when individual power is the topic of research, the investigation tends 
to evaluate the relative power of particular officeholders, as opposed to other 
influential individuals who may have significant influence over policy. For 
example, an investigation might evaluate the relative power of different 
prime ministers or presidents (such as in O’Malley, 2007; Doyle and Elgie, 
2016). While such studies are very informative and provide important 
insights, they begin from the basic assumption that it is relevant to identify 
the important office first. In fact, a typical political science study will not 
necessarily encompass an evaluation of the relative powers of all relevant 
actors who exert influence on a country’s domestic and foreign policy and 
who do not always occupy the highest political post, or indeed any post at all. 
Instead, such studies almost certainly will be restricted by design to the 
examination of the powers of office, i.e., potestas, or be restricted to evaluate 
overall influence of officeholders only. However, once we agree to a more 
plausible assumption that in many instances individuals exist who do not 
occupy significant political offices but who nevertheless possess significant 
auctoritas and who are able to influence politics as a result, the measurement 
of the distribution of power in a political system becomes more complex and 
it is not entirely clear how to conduct rigorous empirical research. For 
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instance, how can scholars account for the enormous influence on European 
or French politics of such individuals as Jean Monnet, who either held ad hoc 
appointments or occupied no posts at all and was never elected?  
In order to differentiate between potestas and auctoritas, we ideally 
require three separate variables. First, we need a measure of the overall 
individual influence on policy or politics that can be attributable to a 
particular individual who is incumbent in his or her office or does not occupy 
any specific office but is nevertheless influential. Second, an indicator that 
gauges the institutional influence of a particular office irrespective of the 
officeholder, perhaps based on the constitutional powers, or a particular 
configuration of veto players, or perhaps as an average influence of that 
office, provided the sample is large enough. And third, we require an 
indicator of personal standing --- auctoritas, separately from the office.  
This is certainly not an easy task. Consider a typical parliamentary 
cabinet where the prime minister is ranked as number one, finance minister -- 
number two, foreign minister -- number three, and so on. Schematically, we 
can assume that following election the leader of the successful party obtains 
the prime ministerial post, while the second-ranked individual takes the 
finance portfolio, and so on. From a practical standpoint, since more 
influential individuals assume more influential offices, the effects of office 
and that of officeholder will be strongly correlated. In addition, since leaders 
occupy offices in some predefined institutional structures, both their offices 
and the individuals holding them will be constrained, or empowered, by 
structural conditions or idiosyncratic events. It is therefore not surprising that 
the majority of studies concerned with measuring power focus on either 
overall personal influence, or formal powers, potestas.  
How to assess the overall levels of political influence of an individual? 
Power is not only difficult to measure, but also not easy to define. This is 
partly because power is applied in a wide range of contexts, from relations 
between a few individuals, to the allocation of resources at the level of a 
polity, to the interaction between states in the international arena, but also 
because it can take the form of more abstract notions such as class relations or 
discursive power. As argued earlier, we limit the scope of the argument by 
focusing specifically on personal political power, i.e., the ability of an 
individual political actor to influence domestic and foreign policy. Such 
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personal political power certainly encompasses the components derived from 
the institutional position an individual political actor occupies --- potestas, and 
those derived from personal experience, standing, connections, charisma and 
skills --- auctoritas. While measurement of personal political power is difficult, 
there are notable political science studies that attempt to develop new 
methods to measure such power. These measures vary from those that are 
concerned with exclusively the more formal aspects of political power to 
those that attempt more comprehensive approaches. 
The first type of measurements is concerned primarily with formal 
powers and look at the institutional arrangements.  One might for example 
compare the British prime minister, the French president, and the president of 
the United States in terms of their relative abilities to influence domestic 
politics. In such studies, the focus is on the institutional powers attributed to 
different offices. The extensive literature on presidentialism, parliamentarism, 
and semi-presidentialism is a good example of such an approach (e.g., Elgie, 
2004). In some very specific circumstances, it might be possible to have 
indicators of relative power that cannot easily be translated to other polities. 
For example, in the United States it might be possible to generate a relative 
ranking of political posts by the line of succession to the presidency, where 
the Vice-President is the first in line, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives second, all the way down to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security at the fifteenth place.3 What these institutional measures have in 
common is that they are all by definition concerned with, and able to account 
for, potestas only.  
The second type of measurements is related to the process of decision-
making. These provide assessments of relative powers in the process of 
reaching a specific set of decisions. For instance, scholars may evaluate the 
relative negotiation powers of different actors. To do so, scholars compare the 
contents of the compromise decision that was reached as a result of the 
																																																								
3  Likewise, U.S. Congress maintains ranking on the basis of seniority 
(Goodwin, 1965), however this does not imply that more senior legislators are 
always more influential on policy-making as other determinants, such the 
relative strength of party factions, affinity to the executive, electoral 
performance or prospects, can factor in. 
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negotiation with observed preferences of actors prior to that negotiation. The 
relative similarity between a coalition government agreement and the original 
party manifestos of the coalition parties provides an example of such an 
approach (Benoit and Laver, 2003). An interesting example of a similar 
approach is the study of redacting in policy documents in the European 
Union, where the argument is made that the more a particular unit within the 
bureaucracy redacts a particular policy text, the more influential this unit is 
(Cross and Hermansson, 2017). 
The third type of measurement focuses on the reputation of decision-
makers. It assumes the most suitable method to capture not only formal and 
informal powers, but also latent powers,4 is the assessment of the reputation 
of political actors. Such studies may ask participants in the political process to 
evaluate each other’s reputation. They utilise public opinion surveys that 
assess the reputation of individual politicians, especially in a local context, or 
experts’ perceptions of reputation through expert surveys. A famous example 
of such an approach is Hunter’s (1953) study of community power in a small 
town (called Regional City), where the relative power of individual members 
of the community are assessed through interviews with members of that 
community. Another, more recent example is Baturo and Elkink’s (2014, 2016) 
study of political elites in Vladimir Putin’s regime which used a unique 
monthly expert survey that assessed the relative influence on policy by the 
top 100 most influential individuals, regardless of their official position, over 
two decades.  
Finally, instead of measuring power directly, scholars can also employ 
proxy variables that are expected to be correlated with power. For example, 
researchers may assume that public opinion support for presidents is a valid 
proxy for the likely overall power an individual president has within the 
system, so that the more popular presidents are assumed to be the more 
powerful. Particular institutional variables, such as cohabitation in semi-
																																																								
4	Such as those of an actor who has the ability to influence the outcome but for 
whatever reason, e.g., because the outcome is already in the preferred 
direction, neglects to do so.  
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presidential regimes or the size of the majority in parliament in support of the 
political leaders, can similarly be used as proxies for individual power. 
While the majority of the studies above all attempt to assess overall 
personal political power, either focusing on potestas alone or more broadly, 
there are few attempts to assess auctoritas separately. Baturo and Elkink (2014) 
offer a statistical method to distinguish between auctoritas and potestas using 
existing expert surveys that measure overall personal political power of 
individuals. The approach estimates auctoritas and potestas by leveraging 
information from observed changes in office for the same individual and from 
changes in the identity of officeholders for the same office. The assumption is 
that if on average each time different individuals who come to a particular 
office have their personal influence increased, that office is the likely source of 
influence, permitting to draw inferences about potestas. Similarly inferences 
about auctoritas are possible by observing changes (or the lack of change) in 
influence when the same individual occupies different offices. Other studies 
exist, such as the work by Fraga (2016) that attempts to separate the 
individual from context by disentangling the effects of political candidates 
from the effects of factors associated with the districts of these candidates. 
In summary, the measurement of personal power in general and the 
separation in its potestas and auctoritas components is not only a considerable 
and exciting challenge in empirical research, it is also required if we are to 
truly understand political power relationships.  
 
The Intertwined Nature of Potestas and Auctoritas  
 
The relationship between auctoritas and potestas is obviously complicated. In 
this section we briefly discuss how auctoritas and potestas are intertwined in 
practice and how the relationship between the two may change depending on 
the context, on the parameters of a political regime and on its overall level of 
institutionalization. 
The two sources of power and influence are closely related to each 
other. For instance, it is conceivable that a person may acquire auctoritas due 
to his or her postestas, or vice versa. Many of the individuals discussed 
throughout the paper and who came to dominate national politics because of 
their auctoritas, oftentimes derived such auctoritas from their prior serving in 
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the highest office, from their ability to install loyalists to important posts 
while serving in the highest office themselves. In this case holding potestas in 
the past permitted individuals to increase their auctoritas, whether as the 
former national security advisor Kissinger who emerged as the utmost 
foreign policy expert and authority, or Putin as Prime Minister who relied on 
his record and on the network of loyalists appointed while he was the 
president earlier. However, based on our reading and interpretation of the 
ancients, the amount of personal influence that an individual political actor 
possesses due to his prior career experience in politics can be understood as 
contemporaneous auctoritas, even though it is the experience of holding 
political offices in the past --- prior potestas --- that contributes to 
contemporaneous auctoritas, among other things. 
What determines the informal component of personal influence that is 
conceptually separate from the powers of office is open to interpretation and 
is therefore challenging. As is clear from our discussion of the concept, 
auctoritas may include one's personality, e.g., oratorical skills, clientage and 
personal standing and reputation. Personal influence thus stems from one's 
background and inherent traits, and is largely time-invariant. However, one 
can reasonably argue that the number and influence of one's clients in 
important positions also determines one's personal auctoritas. The powers of 
patronage therefore belong to the informal component of personal influence, 
even if this is often achieved through the powers of appointment derived 
from potestas. The reverse, being a client of an influential patron, contributes 
to one’s auctoritas, i.e., the position in the informal elite network around the 
leader affects one's personal influence. The precise separation of auctoritas and 
potestas here however depends on one’s definition of institution, however. 
Stable informal patronage networks are, arguably, a form of institutional 
structure.  It is therefore a modelling decision whether to understand 
auctoritas as the amount of individual personal influence determined by 
personal qualities such as education and skills alone, or by non-institutional 
sources of power that will certainly include patronage.  
Researchers therefore need to be clear on the definition of institutions 
as rules since stable informal arrangements of the norms of behavior that may 
underpin formal institutions may also be conceptualized as institutions 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). William Riker (1980) understood institutions as 
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broad rules of behavior concerned with decision-making. If a particular polity 
relies on informal patronage networks and on the norms of behavior 
determined by such networks, rather than on formal institutions, then there 
may be a necessity to reconceptualise what we understand by potestas and 
auctoritas. Eleanor Ostrom (1986) argued that the fusion of informal practices 
and formal institutional rules may lead to the reliance on the so-called “rules-
in-use” that lead to complex situations when formal and informal rules 
overlap.  
The relationship between institutional hierarchy and informal 
hierarchy is also dynamic. Consider the hypothetical situation when the top 
effective leader, No 1, occupies the nominal formal post No 2. Provided the 
time he or she occupies is long enough, in all likelihood the formal perceived 
hierarchy of offices will change, and the previously perceived No 2 office will 
become the No 1, so that the mismatch is no longer. Over time, provided the 
pre-eminent official with auctoritas continues to occupy the position with 
lower potestas, such position may become dominant instead, such as that of 
Shogun over emperors in medieval and modern Japan. Even though the 
emperor formally appointed Shogun, the latter had the real, de facto power in 
the country. Over time, the office of Shogun became hereditary and the focal 
point for the system of government in the country, Shogun’s regime (Mass and 
Hauser, 1985). In other words, the office of Shogun arguably moved to become 
the top position with the highest potestas.  
How to define the hierarchy of offices and formal rules in place may be 
a modelling decision. After October 1917 in Russia, Vladimir Lenin, the leader 
of the revolution, took up the post of the Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars, i.e., the head of government (Sebestyen 2017, 346). Continuing 
with the application of auctoritas and potestas, Lenin possessed the strongest 
auctoritas but also potestas inside the Soviet regime at the time. As Lenin’s 
health deteriorated however, Stalin who was able to assemble the strongest 
network of supporters from his previously inconsequential office of the 
general secretary of the party, was able to sideline rivals and to emerge as the 
leader after Lenin’s death. As a result, the office of the general secretary 
became the strongest political office in the country and remained so until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. In turn, the office of the head of government that 
was No 1 under Lenin, became subordinate to the now new No 1 office, that 
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of the general secretary. In other words, in the context of post-Lenin Soviet 
politics, we cannot argue that the office of the general secretary had lower 
potestas than that of the head of government so that the leader who occupied 
the post of the general secretary dominated merely because of his auctoritas. 
An analyst may need to consider institutions in context, in the perspective of 
Soviet politics, and to recognize that the office of the general secretary was 
formally powerful because it was the top position in a single-party regime 
where party dictated all national policy. Formally, the top leadership position 
was the Collective Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a “rubber stamp” body, 
which was also weaker than the general secretary or the chairman of the 
council of commissars (or later ministers) (Zimmerman, 2014). It is therefore 
erroneous to argue that the presidium had more potestas than the general 
secretary.  
Situations are common in military regimes where the military 
authorities, de facto leaders of the country, may retain, or tolerate, civilian 
leadership that constitutionally holds powers over the military but in reality 
is powerless. For example, in Panama in 1972-81 and later in 1983-89 the 
military leaders acquired the titles of Maximum Leader of National 
Liberation, e.g., Omar Torrijos (1972-81); Manuel Noriega (1983-89), and 
dominated the civil presidents at the time. Obviously, the military leaders 
dominated the office of the president not because of their stronger auctoritas 
but because in the context of the military regime their position was dominant, 
i.e., had much stronger potestas (or perhaps, continuing with the usage of 
terms from antiquity, imperium --- military command).  
In another party-based regime, the People’s Republic of China, 
following the death of the national leader and the general secretary of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping (1978-89) who 
emerged as the new leader of the regime, came to occupy the subordinate 
posts of the Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee (1977-82), Vice Premier 
(1977-80), Chairman of the Central Military Commission (1981-89), formally 
outranked by others, e.g., Premier Zhao (1980-87) or General Secretary of the 
CPC Hu Yaobang (1982-87). However, neither of his posts became 
synonymous with the de facto leadership post for his political successors as 
had Stalin’s party secretary’s post. Instead, Deng’s successors returned to 
occupy the office of the general secretary of CPC that since Mao has been the 
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place for the paramount leadership in the country. Deng Xiaoping therefore 
arguably possessed strong auctoritas that permitted him to dominate those 
with stronger potestas.  
Provided the most powerful individual occupies no formal position, he 
or she himself arguably becomes a quasi-institution, invariably leading to 
overall political deinstitutionalization. For example, when Muammar Gaddafi 
(1969-2011) of Libya relinquished his Chairmanship of the Revolutionary 
Council in 1979 and instead assumed the ceremonial post Brotherly Leader 
and Guide of the Revolution, the office and the officeholder at the national 
level became indistinguishable while the offices of the Secretary-General of 
the General People’s Congress or General Secretary of the General People’s 
Committee were nominal and weak during Gaddafi’s rule.  
Furthermore, the analysis of the relative influence of auctoritas and 
potestas is not only informative for understanding power relations at a 
particular level of politics but may also have implications for understanding  
regime dynamics overall, at the aggregate level. When the effective political 
leader in a country does not occupy the top nominal political post, it may 
suggest that a valid cause for concern exists over possible 
deinstitutionalization. But it is possible that the mismatch is only present at 
the level of national political leadership. When the mismatch is present at all 
levels of government, it gives a clear indication that the regime is significantly 




The separation of personal influence on policy-making in a political regime 
into its institutional and individual sources is a significant challenge. It is 
difficult to achieve not only conceptually due to the interconnected nature of 
the two aspects, but also empirically, due to the significant challenges in 
measuring power in general and separating the two aspects in research 
design. Nevertheless, we argue that research that focuses exclusively on 
formal and institutional power relations runs the risk of missing key 
dynamics of political regimes, and in some cases even overlooks the key 
powerholders and key causes of various policies and outcomes. 
Comparativists rightly focus on institutions in their studies of advanced 
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consolidated democracies such as France or the United States where there	is	a	
high	 degree	 of	 “institutional	 routinization”	 and	where	 individuals	 comply	with	
institutional	 rules	 so	 that	 the	 latter	 largely	 determine	 their	 overall	 political	
influence	 (Linz	 and	 Stepan,	 1996,	 10).	 However,	 as	 the	 above	 mentioned	
examples	from French politics	of	de	Gaulle	and	his	 lieutenant,	Foccart, as well 
as from US politics in relation to individuals in the Trump administration 
suggest, when democratic politics is in flux and important political actors 
either do not comply with norms or are able to exert influence not warranted 
by their institutional position, we need to account for auctoritas in order to 
understand real-life politics fully.  
The examination of formal institutional or constitutional aspects may 
provide great insights into our understanding of democracies and 
dictatorships and in particular the grey area in between. However, such an 
approach can also miss the actual transition or distribution of power in a 
system, as the examples of Kaczynski’s Poland and Putin’s Russia clearly 
illustrate. Therefore, the empirical evaluation of both auctoritas and potestas of 
key officeholders and influential actors without office is of crucial importance, 
particularly in the comparative analysis of illiberal democracies or electoral 
autocracies. 	
We believe that a new research agenda that takes into account the need 
to measure personal sources of power and to understand how such informal 
aspects and relationships impact on the evolution of political regimes is 
urgently overdue (also see Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). We also think that the 
proposed re-introduction of the old concepts of auctoritas and potestas into the 
study of politics may significantly improve significantly our intuitive 
understanding of real-life politics and specific situations that are not easily 










Ahlquist J and Levi M (2011) Leadership: What it means, what it does, and 
what we want to know about it. Annual Review of Political Science 14: 1-24. 
 
Alexiadou D (2015) Ideologues, partisans, and loyalists: Cabinet ministers and 
social welfare reform in parliamentary democracies. Comparative Political 
Studies 48(8): 1051-1086.  
 
Baturo A and Elkink J (2014) Office or officeholder? Regime 
deinstitutionalization and sources of individual political influence. The Journal 
of Politics 76(3): 859-872. 
 
Baturo A and Elkink J (2016) Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–
client networks in Russia, 1999–2014. Post-Soviet Affairs 32(1): 75-98. 
 
Baturo A and Mikhaylov S (2014) Reading the tea Leaves: Medvedev's 
presidency through political rhetoric of federal and sub-national actors. 
Europe-Asia Studies 66(6): 969-92l 
 
Benoit K and Laver M (2003) Estimating Irish party policy positions using 
computer wordscoring: The 2002 election–a research note. Irish Political 
Studies 18(1): 97-107. 
 
Birley A (2000) Marcus Aurelius: A Biography. Routledge. 
 
Blondel J (1987) Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis. Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage. 
 
Brunt P A and Moore J M (1969) Res Gestae Divi Augusti: The Achievements of the 
Divine Augustus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Carnes N and Lupu N (2016) What good is a college degree? Education and 
leader quality reconsidered. Journal of Politics 78(1): 35-49.  
 






washington/	accessed 11 May 2017.	
 
 
Cross J and Hermansson H (2017) Legislative amendments and informal 
politics in the European Union: An automated text-analysis approach, 
European Union Politics, forthcoming. 
 
Dewan T and Squintani F (2016) In defense of factions. American Journal of 
Political Science 60(40): 860-881.  
	 28	
Doyle D and Elgie R (2016) Maximizing the reliability of cross-national 
measures of presidential power. British Journal of Political Science 46(4): 731-
741. 
Eck W (2003) The Age of Augustus. Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Edwards G (1983) Quantitative analysis. In: Edwards G and Stephen Wayne S 
(eds) Studying the Presidency. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 
 
Elgie R (2004) Semi-presidentialism: Concepts, consequences and contesting 




Fraga B (2016) Candidates or districts? Reevaluating the role of race in voter 
turnout. American Journal of Political Science 60(1): 97-122.  
 
Gellman B (2008) Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency. New York: Penguin Press.  
 
Goodwin G (1965) The seniority system in Congress. American Political Science 
Review 53(2): 412-436.  
 
Hazareesingh, S (2012) In the Shadow of the General: Modern France and the Myth 
of De Gaulle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Helmke G and Levitsky S (2004) Informal institutions and comparative politics: 
A research agenda. Perspectives on Politics 2(4): 725-740.  
Kantorowicz E (2016) The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political 
Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kerevel Y (2015) (Sub)national principals, legislative agents: Patronage and 
political careers in Mexico. Comparative Political Studies 48(8): 1020-1050.  
 
Krzymowski M (2015) Poskramianie Beaty Szydlo [The taming of Beata 




Linz J and Stepan A (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
Lukes S (2005) Power. A Radical View. The Original Text with Two Major New 
Chapters. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Mahoney C and Baumgartner F (2015) Partners in advocacy: Lobbyists and 
government officials in Washington. Journal of Politics 77(1): 202-215.  
 
Mass J and Hauser W (1985) The Bakufu in Japanese History. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 
 
Mommsen T (1894) The History of Rome. Vol. I London: Richard Bentley and 
	 29	
Son, Publishers in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen. 
 
Mulcahy K (1986) The secretary of State and the national security adviser: 
Foreign policymaking in the Carter and Reagan administrations. Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 16: 280—99. 
 









Northouse P (2009) Leadership: Theory and Practice. London: Sage Publications.  
 
O'Malley E (2007) The power of prime ministers: Results of an expert 
survey. International Political Science Review 28(1): 7-27. 
 
Ostrom E (1986) An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48: 3-25. 
 
Péan, Pierre (1990) L'Homme de l'Ombre. Paris: Fayard.  
 
Pepinsky T (2016) Colonial migration and the origins of governance: Theory 
and evidence from Java. Comparative Political Studies 49(9):  1201-1237.  
 
Riker W (1980) Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the 
study of  institutions. American Political Science Review 74: 432-447.  
 
Rose R (1991) Prime ministers in parliamentary democracies. West European 






Sebestyen V (2017) Lenin the Dictator. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.  
 
Skarbek D (2016) Covenants without the sword? Comparing prison self-
governance globally. American Political Science Review 110(4): 845-62.  
 
Suetonius (1914) Lives of Ceasars, Volume I. [c. 121 AD]. Boston: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Swartz D (2007) Recasting power in its third dimension. Theory and 
Society, 36(1): 103-109. 
 
The Washington Post (2017) Trump’s hard-line actions have an intellectual 




63c4b4fb5a63_story.html accessed 11 May 2017. 
 
Treisman D (2015) Income, democracy, and leader turnover. American Journal of 
Political Science 59(4): 927-942.  
 
Treisman D (2011) Presidential popularity in a hybrid regime: Russia under 
Yeltsin and Putin. American Journal of Political Science 55(3): 590-609. 
 
Verschave F-X (1999) La Françafrique: Le Plus Long Scandale de la République. 
Paris: Stock. 
 
Weldon J (2007) The Political sources of presidencialismo in Mexico. In: 
Mainwaring C and Shugart M (eds) Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin 
America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Weber M (1978) Economy and Society. [1918] Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
Wirszubski C (1950) Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic 
and Early Principate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Xu, Y and Yang Y (2016) Informal institutions, collective action, and public 
investment in rural China. American Political Science Review 109(2): 371-91.  
Zimmerman  W (2014) Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism from the Revolution to 








Word count (including references and footnotes): 9,820 
Date: 12 May 2017 
